Сунь-Цзы
andy4675
19.06 2020
THE
HISTORY OF
CHINA
Second Edition
David Curtis Wright
Авторский коллектив советников:
John T. Alexander
Professor of History and Russian and European Studies,
University of Kansas
Robert A. Divine
George W. Littlefield Professor in American History Emeritus,
University of Texas at Austin
John V. Lombardi
Professor of History,
University of Florida
Год издания: 2011
Издательство Гринвуд
The earliest textual reference to the crossbow
dates to the middle of the fourth century in the famous Art of War by
Sun-tzu (also spelled Sunzi). One of Sun-tzu’s descendants recorded
the first known use of crossbows on the battlefield in 336 B.C.
Sunzi (d. 320 B.C.): Eastern Zhou military strategist; author of The Art
of War, a manual of strategy.
То есть жизнь реального праобраза "Сунь-Цзы" датируется ныне реальными историками (а не мифологизаторами) серединой 4 века до н. э. Тогда как отец китайской истории Сыма Цянь (автор его жизнеописания) датировал его жизнь 6 веком до н. э. Умер Сунь-Цзы по современной версии - около 320 г. до н. э.
Есть и более смелые оценки... Например, в одной из книг говорится о Временах Вёсен и Осеней, что:
In this period military specialists appeared -
the most famous being Sunzi, supposed author of the Art of War,
which dates back to the fifth century Be.
Это из книги:
A History of China
J. A. G. Roberts
изданов 1999 году издательством Палгрейв.
То есть книга - достаточно существенно более старая, чем в первой цитате. Их разделяет 12 лет - в современном мире это может быть существенным.
"Between History and Philosophy. Anecdotes in Early China", Edited by Paul van Els and Sarah A. Queen, Published by State University of New York Press, Albany, 2017:
Other anecdotes feature well-known figures from China’s extensive past, such
as the Duke of Zhou (r. 1042–1036 BCE), Duke Wen of Jin(r. 636–628 BCE), King Fuchai of Wu (r. 495–473 BCE), KingGoujian of Yue (r. 496–465 BCE), Kongzi (551–479 BCE),better known to Western readers as Confucius, and Sunzi (ca. 545–470BCE), also known as Sun Tzu. These actual historical persons fascinatedthe creators of anecdotes, as well as their readers, all of whom belonged tothe literate upper echelons of society.
Авторы указанной книги о китайских народных анекдотах и поучительных рассказах, при датировке жизни Сун-Цзы следуют легенде изложенной Сыма Цянем. С точки зрения китайских народных анекдотов - это целесообразно, как ни поворачивай.
In an excavated
manuscript text, Sun Wu, the master of war, is said to haveremarked that the grade of land tax commonly imposed by the ministerialfamilies on the lands they owned in the northern state Jin during the sixthcentury BC was 20%, a very high figure which Sun Wu considered wouldinevitably lead some of these families to fall.1010 This is the text named “Questions by the King of Wu,” one of the two lost texts withrelation to Sun Wu that were discovered in 1972 together with the Art of War traditionallyattributed to him in a tomb at Yinqueshan in Shandong Province, dating to the WesternHan period (206 BC – AD 8).
This had also led to significant changes in commandership. The old
aristocrats were trained to direct themselves in battle, but the peasant–soldiers, many conscripted on short terms, were not. Many of them mightnot even know how to act as soldiers if they were left out by the army.Therefore, the Warring States armies were carefully constructed organizationswith strictly defined ranks and the hierarchy of authority, commandedby professional military strategists who might not have been themselvesphysically competent in combat. The famous example was Sun Bin, a handicappedcommander who led the Qi army to great victories in the late fourthcentury BC. The age of war certainly also gave rise to the composition of along list ofmilitary texts in Early China,most famously the Art ofWar by SunWu, a commander in the southern state Wu during the late Spring andAutumn period (Box 9.1).The latter text has inspired generations of militarycommanders over the past 2,000 years and continues to be taught in manymilitary academies throughout the world today including West Point in theUnited States.
Box 9.1 The Story of Sun Wu and the Discovery
of Military Texts at YinqueshanSima Qian, the Grand Scribe of the Western Han dynasty, tells thestory of Sun Wu (also known as Sunzi or Suntzu):Sun Wu was a native of the northern state Qi, who had come to meet with the kingof Wu and offered the king his Art of War in thirteen chapters. The king afterreviewing the text challenged him: “I have carefully read your chapters, but canyou put your theory to a little test?”Sun Wu replied: “Yes!”The king pursued: “Can you try it on women?”Sun Wu replied again: “Sure!”Thus, the king sent out 180 beautiful ladies from his palace and Sun Wu dividedthem into two teams with one of the king’s most beloved consorts to be the captain ofeach.Once at the start, Sun Wu asked the ladies: “Do you all know the differencebetween front and back, your right hand and left hand?”“Yes!” The ladies responded.Sun Wu continued: “When I say ‘Eyes front,’ you must look straight ahead.When I say ‘Turn left,’ you must face your left hand. When I say ‘Turn right,’ youmust face your right hand. When I say ‘Turn back,’ you must turn round towardsyour back. Understood?”“Understood.” The ladies replied.When the drums were thundered, Sun Wu gave his first order: “Turn right!”The ladies burst out laughing. Sun Wu announced: “If the order was notsufficiently clarified, that is the fault of the commander.”The drill continued as Sun Wu gave his second order: “Turn left!”The ladies burst out laughing again. SunWu said: “When the order was clarified,but it is not followed by the soldiers, this is the fault of the officers!”Thus Sun Wu ordered the execution of the two captains. Stunned by Sun Wu’sorder, the king of Wu, watching from a high platform, hurriedly sent down hiswords: “I already know you are capable of commanding troops, but please sparethe two concubines! Without them I won’t be able to know the taste of my food.”Sun Wu replied, solidly: “Once commissioned by your majesty to command thisarmy, I am now in the field, and I have no leisure to take your order!”A text called Audience with the King of Wu, written on bamboo stripsthat parallels very closely the above narrative by Sima Qian, wasexcavated in 1972 in tomb no. 1 at Yinqueshan in southernShandong, dating by the typological features of the ceramics andcoins from the tomb to the early phase of the Western Han. Fromthe same tomb, as many as 4,942 bamboo strips were excavated.Astonishingly, included among the texts on these strips are also twodifferent texts both bearing the title Art ofWar. One is the Art ofWar ofSun Wu which parallels very closely the received version of the text,although the strips from the tomb offer only eight of the supposedthirteen chapter titles. The other Art ofWar is identified with Sun Bin,the handicapped general of the state of Qi who led the Qi army intogreat victories over the hegemonic state Wei. This text not only elaborateson the principles laid out by SunWu in the earlier Art ofWar, butalso records the career of Sun Bin and his struggle with Wei. Othertexts included in the corpus are the Wei Liaozi, Yanzi, Six SecretStrategies, Shoufa shouling, all texts of military nature known previouslyto have been produced in theWarring States period. These texts werepublished together in 1981.When the second volume on the Yinqueshan tomb was publishedin January 2010, it offered an additional group of some fifty previouslyunknown essays on government and military affairs, togetherwith other texts related to natural philosophy and divination. Thenature of the texts from the tomb suggests that the person buried inthe tomb might have been a professional military commander whodied in an early year of EmperorWu (r. 141–87 BC). Incidentally onthe bottoms of two wine lacquer cups from his tomb is written theterm “Supervisor of Horses” (sima), which was a well-known militarytitle. Although these texts are written in Han clerical style andare Han Dynasty texts, many of them were doubtless transmittedfrom the Warring States period if not earlier.The Art of War by Sun Wu, the Wei Liaozi, and the Six SecretStrategies are counted among the famous “Seven Military Classics”for which full-length English translations are available.1616 See Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.), The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder:Westview Press, 1993).
Автор (этнический китаец) приводит очень ценную информацию. Но датирует жизнь Сунь-Цзы (которого предпочитает именовать Сунь-У) - ровно так, как любят сами китайцы, то есть по Сыма Цяню. То есть концом эпохи Вёсен и Осеней (конец 6 или 5 века до н. э.). То есть ещё до начала (или в самом начале) эпохи "Сражающихся царств".
Дорофи Перкинс, "Энциклопедия Китая. История и Культура", издательство Рутледж, 1998 год:
SUNZI (Sun Tzu; fourth century В. С.) A military strategist,also known as Sun Wu, who is attributed with writingthe classical Chinese treatise on the art of war and strategy,known as The Art of War, The Military Science of Sunzi, simply the Sunzi (Sun Tzu; Master Sun). This text actuallywas compiled in the fourth century B.C. It was later incorporatedinto the canon of the Daoist religion, a collection of1,400 texts printed in 1445 known as the Daozang (JaoTsung). Bamboo slips bearing the text of the Sunzi were discoveredin tombs on Yinque Mountain dating from the Handynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220).Sunzi was born to a military family in modern HuiminCounty, in the state of Qi in modern Shandong Province, andhe studied military science. He began his text on the art ofwar by arguing that war is the most important matter to agovernment, determining the survival or death of the state.Some of the 13 chapters are titled "The Strategy of Attack,""Disposition of Military Strength," "Use of Energy," "Weaknessesand Strengths," "Maneuvering," "Variation of Tactics"and "The Use of Spies." Sunzi maintained that the way tovictory is to work in harmony with nature rather than simplyto employ brute force, and to outwit the enemy and win bydeceit without having to fight a battle. He told the story of ageneral who tricked his enemy into believing an undefendedcity really was protected by a large army by leaving the citygates open and leisurely playing a musical instrument on thecity walls. Sunzi taught that if a battle is necessary, it shouldbe fought quickly, with surprise attacks that strike at theenemy's weak point, to force a quick victory.Sunzi's work, which was compiled sometime between 400and 320 В. С. was widely read at the end of the Warring StatesPeriod (403-221 В. С.) when many feudal states in Chinawere contending with each other for power. It was certainlystudied by the First Emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, a harsh rulerwho unified China under the Qin dynasty (221-206 В. С. The Sunzi continued to influence Chinese military leaders,scholars and strategists, such as the great general Cao Cao(Ts'ao Ts'ao; 155-220), who wrote commentaries on the text.The modern Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong (MaoTse-tung) drew upon the ideas of Sunzi while developing hisstrategy for the Chinese Communist People's LiberationArmy (PLA), which in 1949 defeated the Chinese Nationalist(Kuomintang; KMT) army led by Chiang Kai-shek, enablingthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to found the People'sRepublic of China (PRC). In the eighth century the Sunzi wasintroduced to Japan and other foreign countries. In 1772 thework was introduced to Europe through a translation by aFrench Jesuit priest published in Paris, and it was studied byNapoleon Bonaparte. The work has now been translated intomore than 12 languages.In 1992 the Academy of Classical Learning of Sunzi wasopened at Huimin in Shandong. The PRC has held severalinternational symposiums on the military science of Sunzi,with scholars discussing such concepts as the application ofSunzi's principles to modern business management. Bookson this topic have been published in Chinese, Japanese andEnglish. Contemporary military leaders around the worldhave studied Sunzi's teachings on the art of war. During thePersian Gulf War in 1991, the chief commander of the U.S.Marine Corps required all marine officials to read an Englishtranslation of the Sunzi See also CAO CAO; DAOISM; DAOISTCLASSICAL TEXTS; JESUITS; MAO ZEDONG; PEOPLE'S LIBERATIONARMY; QIN SHI HUANGDI; WARRING STATES PERIOD.
В письме к своему другу, Рен Шаокину, Сыма Цянь писал:
Those like Tso Ch’iu, who was blind, or Sun Tzu, who had no feet, couldnever hold office
То есть люди слепые, как Чи-ю, или безногие, как Сунь-Цзы, не могли занимать в Китае должностей. Поэтому эти двое и ушли на покой, где написали свои книги.
It is generally believed that the military thought of ancient China originated in the
Spring and Autumn Period, with the book Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa)being its representative.Actually this is not borne out by history.As a seasoned bookdiscussing military tactics, that work came to be regarded as the canonical treatiseon the subject by tacticians of the subsequent dynasties, even though the thoughts itexpressed were not the oldest ones.
Ещё одна датировка работы Сунь-Цзы временами Вёсен и Осеней... И вновь - от китайского по происхождению автора... И более того - книга финансирована Китаем.
The Book of Changes (Zhouyi) is the earliest extant work that reflects ancient
military thought.1 These military thoughts were derived from the practice of war.The period of transition from the Shang Dynasty to the Western Zhou Dynasty1As early as the Southern Song, the famous scholar Wang Yinglin said in his book Example aComprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government (Tongjian Da Wen): “In the Book of Changes, themilitary tactics was all included in it.” The same opinion was shared by the modern well-knownscholar Guo Moruo in his “Study On Chinese Ancient Society,” printed in On History, the firstvolume of Guo Moruo’s Complete Works (People Publishing House, 1982), by Li Jingchi in hisInterpretation of the Book of Changes (Zhouyi Tongyi) (Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), and byGao Heng in Current Interpretations of the Ancient Book of Changes (Zhonghua Book Company,1984).witnessed a series of wars, which are noted in the Book of Changes. Generallyspeaking, what the Book of Changes attaches the highest value to is peacefulcoexistence and a situation in which those who abuse their power to bully the weakare put to shame. As is stated by the sequence of nine Chinese characters whichforms the bottom line of the “Dui Hexagram” (Dui Gua): “[h]e [who] treats peopleamiably will enjoy good fortune.” Dui means “harmony.” The harmony betweennations can invite great fortune. The sequence of nine characters in the second lineof the “Dui Hexagram” follows on with “[h]e [who] treats people amiably withgood fortune his regret will disappear.” The sequence of six characters in the thirdline of the hexagram says: “[h]e [who] pleases others to seek amiability, he will havetroubles.” It can be seen that misfortune will befall a nation which takes advantageof its power and imposes its will on the other nations. Reading certain descriptionsof war in the Book of Changes, it may be discerned that the author of the book wasstrongly antiwar. The nine characters in the fourth line of the “Li Hexagram” (LiGua) state: “he [who] is violent and brutal as a sudden fire burns all things intoashes, thus he is discarded by people.” This could be referring to a swift attackwhich causes disaster for the attacker. The sentiments of the author are thereforepacifist, and what he was seeking was a peaceful world in which “the rulers rulethe nation mildly, and every nation is in peace.” This is in accord with the politicalthought of the rulers of theWestern Zhou – “[w]e launch wars to protect our people”and “[b]e benevolent to all the people and treasure their property.” These thoughtswere repeatedly promoted.While the Book of Changes advocates a peaceful approach when dealing withdisputes between nations, it does not object to justified war where sufficient reasonexists. The six characters in the top line of the “Qian Hexagram” (Qian Gua) say:“[h]e shows his modesty and sympathy, but it is not quite effective, he has to resort toarms to solve disputes within his states.” It is vital for a ruler to win moral supportbefore he launches a war, for that support may help him to survive the war. Thenine characters in the top line of the “Meng Hexagram” (Meng Gua) tell us: “[h]epunishes the ignorant, violence will bring hostility; proper measures enable bothsides to cooperate against dense ignorance.” This means that to actively invade othernations will prove unprofitable for one’s country, whereas wars of defense will beprofitable. The Book of Changes reiterates that one has to be prudent with warfareand must lay emphasis on the preparation and planning for a war before it breaksout. One should never launch a war ignorantly. This much can be gleaned fromthe words of the “Yu Hexagram” (Yu Gua): “[i]t is a favorable time for the kingto establish his vassal and go on a campaign.” Military affairs and national eventsrequire our careful consideration and comprehensive preparation. Once troops havebeen dispatched, the discipline and the rules by which they are governed are ofprofound consequence to the outcome of the war. The sequence of six characters inthe bottom line of the “Shi Hexagram” (Shi Gua) maintains that “the army must bestrictly disciplined in its military operations; otherwise there will be misfortune.”For an army without strict discipline, victory will prove to be as elusive as a castlein the air. The Book of Changes also talks about the guiding principle behind wars.The first principle is to be brave and resolute when attacking. As is said in thesequence of nine characters in the fourth line of the “Jin Hexagram” (Jin Gua),“[h]e makes progress like a greedy and timid rat. If he persists, he will meet withdanger.” Timidity will inevitably meet with failure. The second principle is to seizethe fortress and to defeat one’s enemy with a single blow. The sequence of ninecharacters in the third line of the words of the “Tongren Hexagram” (Tongren Gua)reads as follows: “[t]he troops hide in ambush in the grass, he climbs up the highhill to keep a close watch on the enemy. For three years, he dares not attack theenemy.” Sometimes, one battle will be sufficient to cripple one’s enemy so they willbe unable to recover for several years.
То есть первые мысли военной теории выражаются в тексте, датируемом ещё ранее, чем Сунь-Цзы - в "Книге перемен". Далее был трактат Сунь-Цзы:
If one esteems themilitary thoughts in the Book of Changes as a piece of valuable
jade, then Sun Tzu’s The Art of War may be seen as a precious pearl. Regarded asthe “originator of oriental strategies,” that text served as a guidebook for the militarythoughts and practices of later dynasties. No book emerged in subsequent timeswhich could exceed its breadth and depth.Sun Tzu’s The Art of War was written by Sun Wu (544–496 BC), who was afamous general in the State of Wu. The book consists of thirteen articles, eachdealing with a particular topic. Collectively, these topics form a complete systemof ideology.Sun Tzu was always prudent where war was concerned. This prudence towardswar can be witnessed in all of his articles. He said: “[t]he art of war is of vitalimportance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety orto ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected”(Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: On Laying Plans – Ji Pian). War matters much to theexistence and the life of the people. Thus, we have no choice but to handle it withcare. Sun Tzu was for “prudence in war,” but he was not afraid of war. He thoughtthat when choosing to go to war or not, the core criterion should be whether or notthis served the national interest. As it is written:Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks withoutcultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is a waste of time and general stagnation.Hence the saying: ‘The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good generalcultivates his resources.’ Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unlessthere is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. No ruler should puttroops into the field merely to gratify his spleen; no general should fight a battle simply outof pique. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Angermay in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. But a kingdom thathas once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be broughtback to life. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful and the good general full of caution.This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War:Attack by Fire – Huo Gong Jian)Any war – whatever form it takes and whatever strategy it uses – must be closelyrelated to the interests of politics and the economy. Thus, we can see that “interests”(Liyi) is the broadest and the most common expression for the purpose of war.In this vein, Sun Tzu decided to generalize the factors that affect a war into fiveaspects: “The first is the Moral Law, the second is Heaven, the third is Earth, thefourth is the Commanders, and the fifth is Method and Discipline” (Sun Tzu’s TheArt of War: Laying Plans). Among the five factors, the Moral Law (Dao) is themost important. He states that “The Moral Law is to make the people and theirlord be of one mind,” so it means to win the support of the people. Factors suchas the heaven (Tian), the earth (Di), the commanders (Jiang), and the method anddiscipline (Fa) follow on from this. The “Heaven” signifies Yin and Yang, coldand heat, times and seasons; the “Earth” comprises high and low distances, farand near, broad and narrow, great and small, danger and safety, open ground andnarrow passes, the chances of life and death; “the Commanders” vary in wisdom,faithfulness, benevolence, courage and strictness; “Method and Discipline” aredifferent in quzhi (military formation), guandao (responsibilities of the officers),and zhuyong (supply). These summaries laid foundation for the strategic analysis.The highest goal guiding warfare in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is that “the skillfulleaders subdue the enemy’s troops without any fighting,” which means that he canachieve his strategic goal of “self-defense and winning outright” through launchingdeterrents. He states that:In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole andintact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture a regiment, adetachment or a company entire than to destroy them. Hence to fight and conquer in all yourbattles is not supreme excellence; the supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’sresistance without fighting. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’splans; the next best thing is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in orderis to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walledcities [ : : : ]. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting;he captures their cities without laying siege to them; He overthrows their kingdom withoutlengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of theEmpire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method ofattacking by stratagem. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Attack by Stratagem – Mo Gong Pian)Sun Tzu believed that the best policy in military affairs was to win throughstrategy; the second best was to win through diplomacy; the worst was to winthrough war; to besiege a city was even baser still than the worst policy.Nevertheless, “[t]o subdue the enemy’s troops without any fighting” is a goal thatis hard to achieve. Hence, Sun Tzu placed greater emphasis upon how to pursue awar in reality. He put forward a number of guidelines to help people conduct wars.For instance, “[i]f you knowyour enemy and yourself, you need not fear the result ofa hundred battles.” Also, “[t]he clever combatant imposes his will upon the enemy,but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” These two quotationssignify that one should be positive in the war, so that one will not be led by theenemy. Sun Tzu went on to write that “[h]e who can modify his tactics in relationto his opponent : : : [can] : : : thereby succeed in winning.” This means that oneshould be swift in adapting one’s methods according to a change in one’s enemy.This is the same point as is being imparted in the clause “just as water retains noconstant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.” To be stubborn is thelast resort. He tells us: “[i]n war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthycampaigns.” The economy lays the material foundation for the war, for as it statesin the book:In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as manyheavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail–clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carrythem a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainments ofguests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reachthe total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100000 men. (Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Waging War – Zhou Zhen Pian)War is so costly that no nation can withstand a lengthy campaign. Thus, Sun Tzusuggested that “[i]n the war, let your great object be victory, not : : : [a] : : : lengthycampaign,” for he had realized that “if the campaign is protracted, the resources ofthe State will not be equal to the strain” and the consequences would be awful.There are many multisided theories in relation to defense and attack in Sun Tzu’sThe Art of War. The rule for offsetting the army is:[i]f our forces are ten to that of the enemy, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; iftwice as numbers, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer the enemy;if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, wecan flee from him. (Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Terrain – Xing Pian)The commander should know well how to deal with the relationship betweendefense and attack. The book notes this in the following way:The good fighters of the old times first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat,and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. To secure ourselves againstdefeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by theenemy himself. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannotmake certain of defeating the enemy [ : : : ]. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: TacticalDispositions – Jun Xing Pian)The positive element of defense is always in your hands, while the opportunityto attack is provided by the enemy’s error and negligence. As it states in thebook: “[t]he general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recessesof the earth” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Tactical Dispositions). Also, he willrobustly and secretly defend himself. In addition, in attack, he “flashes forth fromthe topmost heights of heaven.” Moreover, he will surprise the weak and avoid thestrong. Meanwhile, he will launch a sudden attack on the area where the enemy isunprepared. These factors all contribute to the mystery of the war.Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is also very particular about the distribution of militaryforces in war. It records:The control of a large force : : : [follows] : : : the same principle as the control of a fewmen: It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. Fighting with a large numberarmy under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merelya question of instituting signs and signals. To ensure that your whole host may withstandthe brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is affected by direct and indirectmaneuvers. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Energy – Shipian)This means that in order to command an army which is great in number, oneshould depend on the appropriate distribution of military forces and groups. Ifone wants the whole of the army to act as one and to fight to their best, thenone should rely on proper commanding (the use of “signs and signals” – Jinqi,Jingu); if one wants one’s army to be in a position of constant victory, one shouldturn to the application of “direct and indirect maneuvers” (Qizhen). “Direct andindirect maneuvers” are military terms that were widely used in ancient China.This contained two sides: in the distribution of military forces, the side responsiblefor attacking the enemy openly was the “direct” one; the side responsible forsurrounding and outflanking was the “indirect.” The side for clamping down on theenemy was the “direct” one; the side for striking was the “indirect.” Fighting withthe enemy with formations on the battlefield was “direct”; taking flexible militaryactions was “indirect.” As for the method of war, attacking openly was “direct”;a rapid strike was “indirect.” To fight according to common ways was “direct”; touse an element of surprise was “indirect.” Sun Tzu writes: “[i]n all fighting, thedirect method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be neededin order to secure victory” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Energy). According to this,we may see that a skillful commander must be adept at the use of both “direct” and“indirect” maneuvers. As it states in the book: “[i]n battle, there not more than twomethods of attack—the direct and indirect; yet those two in combination give rise toan endless series of maneuvers” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Energy). Commandinga war is amatter of using of direct and indirect maneuvers. The direct attack betweentroops always meets their victory by the use of indirect maneuvers, which includeflank attack, outflank, sudden attack, surrounding, and so on. The combinationsof direct and indirect maneuvers are endless, as is the military distribution (themilitary energy and battle formation). Consequently, the commander should not betoo stubborn.Sun Tzu once said: “[i]f you know both your enemy and yourself you need notfear the result of a hundred battles.” “Knowing your enemy” (Zhi Bi) is being able toobtain information about your enemy,which is of direct consequence to the outcomeof the war. As is demonstrated in the book, “ : : : what enables the wise sovereignand the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach ofordinary men, is foreknowledge.” Now knowledge cannot be elicited from spirits,it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor deduced by any calculations.Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be gleaned through spies. Sun Tzuattached special importance to the use of spies, upon whose intelligence the wholetroop could base their actions. Meanwhile, Sun Tzu pointed out that “spies cannotbe useful[ly] employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. They cannot be properlymanaged without benevolence and straightforwardness.Without subtle ingenuity ofmind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.” When using spies, onehas to be wise, resolute, and careful in order not to be taken in by the enemy. Asis said in the book, “[i]f you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory willnot stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and the Earth, you may make your victorycomplete” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Terrain). Closeness, a narrow horizon, andself-approbation will never lead to victory.
The Warring States Period witnessed a series of wars (picture 12), whichprovided military thinkers with rich materials. Sun Bin’s Art of War (Sun Bin Binfa)stands as its representative, revealing all the features of the military thoughts of thatera.Sun Bin’s Art of War was written by Sun Bin and his followers. Sun Bin was aman of the State of Qi in theWarring States Period.2 Containing thirteen articles, thebook is regarded as the inheritance and promotion of the military thoughts recordedin Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.Fundamentally, Sun Bin’s Art of War continued the thoughts of “prudencetowards war” (Shen Zhan) found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. The book held thatthe results of war determine the fate of a nation. The result will determine whetherthe nation will bloom or fade. For this reason, we are required to tread with care:“Victory will ensure the survival of a nation; while losing a war will make yourlands decrease and endanger your state. Thus it is indispensible for the one who isto launch a war to think completely” (Sun Bin’s Art of War: On Meeting Wei Wangof Qi – Jian Wei Wang).2Records of the Grand Historian: Biographies of Sun Tzu and Wu Qi (Shiji: Sunzi Wuqi Liezhuan)records the following: “[a] hundred years latter of Sun Tzu’s death, there was a tactician calledSun Bin.” The History of the Han Dynasty: Treatise on Literature (Hanshu: Yiwen Zhi) describesSun Bin’s Art of War, which it calls Sun Tzu of the State of Qi (Qi Sun Bin), as being lost. Sincethe Northern Song Dynasty, ancient classical writers became so skeptical that someone held thatthe author of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War was Sun Bin, while the book Sun Bin’s Art of War neveractually existed. The copies of Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War and Sun Bin’s Art Of War recorded onbamboo, which were discovered in the Han Tombs on Mount Silver Bird, Linyi, Shandong in 1972quashed those doubts.
И т. д. - далее не цитирую. В принципе далее речь уже не о Сунь-Цзы.
Почему оспаривается историчность личности Сунь-Цзы, а также проблема авторства "Искусства войны":
By the experts’ current understanding, all early Chinese texts are “composite texts,” texts compiled over time from impressive rhetoric ascribed to certain authors, often on vague impressions and little or no evidence. The Art of War (Sunzi bingfa
) is no exception to this general rule. Compiled in the last century or so of the Zhanguo period (475–221 BCE),2 the work doubtless represents insights garnered over long centuries by different hands, possibly even by experts operating in different locations. That said, up to today, later writers, whether commentators or not, have generally accepted the same long-standing tradition: that TheArt of War text was compiled by Sunzi (Sun Wu, or Sun Tzu), who served the king of Wuin the late sixth century BCE. However gratifying this tale, it cannot be verified at this remove, and indeed is unlikely to be true.Although a Sunzi (Master Sun) makes a brief appearance in the Lüshi chunqiu(compiled ca. 238 BCE), Sun Wu, the legendary general to whom The Art of War is ascribed, does not appear “on record” before Sima Qian’s Historical Records or Shiji (compiled ca. 90 BCE) composes a biography for him. (An excavated manuscript from around the same time as the Shiji bears witness to Sun Wu’s immense fame as military master, however.) Before the second century of Western Han rule, then, the Sun Wu legend is nearly complete: this Sunzi is the advisor who persuaded King Helu of Wu to adopt a new mode of warfare, deploying mass infantry troops rather than nobles in four-horse chariots—a method credited with gaining Helu’s stunning victory over his neighbor, mighty Chu, in 506 BCE. Sunzi’s method and tactics are summarized in Sima Qian’s biography in one memorable scene where Sunzi drills 180 of the king’s concubines in the new tight battle formations he envisions, and dares to behead two of them who disobey his orders. Having persuaded the palace women that they should follow him “through heaven and earth,” he goes on to lead the men of Wu by similar methods to an easy defeat of Wu's rival.The problem is this: that Sun Wu alone, in stark contrast to such heroes as Wu Zixu and Pang Juan, does not figure in any of the early masterworks that lovingly detail the complex maneuvers of the southern kingdom of Wu. For this reason, scholars since the twelfth century have repeatedly queried the historicity of the Sunzi narrative. The doubters have explored a range of explanations for the anomaly: (1) that Sun Wu never existed, and he is no more than a doppelgänger for Wu Zixu; (2) that Sun Bin, a better-attested general working 150 years later for Qi, needed a respectable forebear, and so a Sun Wu (“Sun the Martial”) was devised to fill that role by a person or persons unknown; (3) that Sun Wu, whether he existed or not, is credited with the same characteristics as all other military geniuses in the story cycles; and (4) that listeners and readers well versed in the rhetoric of high cultural learning within manuscript culture freely invented and adapted usable pasts to any pressing matters at hand.There is an old joke among classicists: “The Iliad was not written by Homer, but by somebody else with the same name.” This saying could be easily adapted to apply to The Art of War ascribed to Sunzi, as moderns today have no access to more biographical material about this master than we find in passages of fairly late date. Unless one can prove that the Sunzi who wrote TheArt of War is the same general Sunzi who drilled the king’s concubines and won the Battle of Boju, then the text might as well be compiled “by somebody else with the same name.”
Аллилуйя...
andy4675
20.06 2020
А почему пост появился в таком покоцанном виде? За что обрезали? Чем вам концовка поста - где сообщается САМАЯ ВАЖНАЯ информация - не понравился? Или не угодил...
andy4675
20.06 2020
"Книга перемен" (И-цинь) датируется эпохой Раннего Чжоу, между 1.000 и 750 г. г. до н. э. Это было руководство для гадания. В период 500 - 200 г. г. до н. э. эта книга обросла сборником комментариев, известных как "Десять крыльев" (Ши-и), и превратилась в космологическим текстом, с набором комментариев древнекитайских философов. Ядром исконного текста считается текст носящин название "Перемены Чжоу" (Чжоу-и). Современные учёные датируют собственно "Книгу перемен" как текст в его современной, известной нам ныне форме, по разному - от 10 до 4 века до н. э. "Книга перемен" считается одним из древнейших китайских текстов. Понятие "перемен" в названии текста принято интерпретировать в том смысле, что поскольку текст повествует о гексаграммах, то речь идёт о переменах, совершавшихся по ходу истории при начертании гексаграмм.
Китайский миф приписывает авторство "Чжоу-и" ("Перемен Чжоу") легендарному основателю династии Чжоу, Вэнь-вану и его младшему сыну Чжоу-гуну (практически основателю империи Чжоу). Также этот текст связывался с мифическим изобретателем китайских триграмм - Фу-си (это своего рода китайский Ной, а также мифический культурный герой Китая). В самом тексте Чжоу-и о его авторстве не сказано ничего. Во 2 веке н. э. среди китайских философов и комментаторов возник консенсус, приписывавший коллективное авторство "Книги перемен" Фу-си, Вэнь-вану, Чжоу-гуну и Конфуцию. Эту идею выдвинул комментатор Цзычен Ма Рон.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Ching
Понятно, что из четырёх "авторов" - один просто мифический, двое - как минимум легендарные, и только Конфуция можно считать лицом достоверно историческим. Но конкретно Конфуцию приписываться авторство стало сравнительно поздно, судя по всему.
andy4675
21.06 2020
"Анналы Люй Бу-вэя" - древнекитайский энциклопедический трактат. Традиционно датируется 239 г. до н. э. - и современные учёные согласны, что он составлен около этого времени. Впервые этот трактат упоминается Сыма Цянем (он жил примерно 150 лет после традиционной даты создания трактата). В них тоже (наряду с "Историческими записками" Сыма Цяня) упоминается личность Сунь-Цзы.
andy4675
21.06 2020
Куда девались китайские книги. Китайская версия (оспариваемая ныне - в том числе на основании свидетельств древнекитайских источников):