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Фотография andy4675 andy4675 19.06 2020

THE
HISTORY OF
CHINA
Second Edition
David Curtis Wright
Авторский коллектив советников:
John T. Alexander
Professor of History and Russian and European Studies,
University of Kansas
Robert A. Divine
George W. Littlefield Professor in American History Emeritus,
University of Texas at Austin
John V. Lombardi
Professor of History,
University of Florida
Год издания: 2011
Издательство Гринвуд
 

The earliest textual reference to the crossbow
dates to the middle of the fourth century in the famous Art of War by
Sun-tzu (also spelled Sunzi). One of Sun-tzu’s descendants recorded
the first known use of crossbows on the battlefield in 336 B.C.

 

Sunzi (d. 320 B.C.): Eastern Zhou military strategist; author of The Art
of War, a manual of strategy.

 

То есть жизнь реального праобраза "Сунь-Цзы" датируется ныне реальными историками (а не мифологизаторами) серединой 4 века до н. э. Тогда как отец китайской истории Сыма Цянь (автор его жизнеописания) датировал его жизнь 6 веком до н. э. Умер Сунь-Цзы по современной версии - около 320 г. до н. э.
 
Есть и более смелые оценки... Например, в одной из книг говорится о Временах Вёсен и Осеней, что:
 

In this period military specialists appeared -
the most famous being Sunzi, supposed author of the Art of War,
which dates back to the fifth century Be.

 
Это из книги:
 
A History of China
J. A. G. Roberts
изданов 1999 году издательством Палгрейв.
 
То есть книга - достаточно существенно более старая, чем в первой цитате. Их разделяет 12 лет - в современном мире это может быть существенным.
 

"Between History and Philosophy. Anecdotes in Early China", Edited by Paul van Els and Sarah A. Queen, Published by State University of New York Press, Albany, 2017:

 

 

Other anecdotes feature well-known figures from China’s extensive past, such

as the Duke of Zhou (r. 1042–1036 BCE), Duke Wen of Jin
(r. 636–628 BCE), King Fuchai of Wu (r. 495–473 BCE), King
Goujian of Yue (r. 496–465 BCE), Kongzi (551–479 BCE),
better known to Western readers as Confucius, and Sunzi (ca. 545–470
BCE), also known as Sun Tzu. These actual historical persons fascinated
the creators of anecdotes, as well as their readers, all of whom belonged to
the literate upper echelons of society.

 

Авторы указанной книги о китайских народных анекдотах и поучительных рассказах, при датировке жизни Сун-Цзы следуют легенде изложенной Сыма Цянем. С точки зрения китайских народных анекдотов - это целесообразно, как ни поворачивай.

 

Early China. A Social and Cultural History
Li Feng (профессор Древнекитайской Истории и Археологии в Columbia University)
Cambridge University Press 2013:

 

 

In an excavated

manuscript text, Sun Wu, the master of war, is said to have
remarked that the grade of land tax commonly imposed by the ministerial
families on the lands they owned in the northern state Jin during the sixth
century BC was 20%, a very high figure which Sun Wu considered would
inevitably lead some of these families to fall.10
 
10 This is the text named “Questions by the King of Wu,” one of the two lost texts with
relation to Sun Wu that were discovered in 1972 together with the Art of War traditionally
attributed to him in a tomb at Yinqueshan in Shandong Province, dating to the Western
Han period (206 BC – AD 8).

 

 

This had also led to significant changes in commandership. The old

aristocrats were trained to direct themselves in battle, but the peasant–
soldiers, many conscripted on short terms, were not. Many of them might
not even know how to act as soldiers if they were left out by the army.
Therefore, the Warring States armies were carefully constructed organizations
with strictly defined ranks and the hierarchy of authority, commanded
by professional military strategists who might not have been themselves
physically competent in combat. The famous example was Sun Bin, a handicapped
commander who led the Qi army to great victories in the late fourth
century BC. The age of war certainly also gave rise to the composition of a
long list ofmilitary texts in Early China,most famously the Art ofWar by Sun
Wu, a commander in the southern state Wu during the late Spring and
Autumn period (Box 9.1).The latter text has inspired generations of military
commanders over the past 2,000 years and continues to be taught in many
military academies throughout the world today including West Point in the
United States.

 

 

Box 9.1 The Story of Sun Wu and the Discovery

of Military Texts at Yinqueshan
Sima Qian, the Grand Scribe of the Western Han dynasty, tells the
story of Sun Wu (also known as Sunzi or Suntzu):
Sun Wu was a native of the northern state Qi, who had come to meet with the king
of Wu and offered the king his Art of War in thirteen chapters. The king after
reviewing the text challenged him: “I have carefully read your chapters, but can
you put your theory to a little test?”
Sun Wu replied: “Yes!”
The king pursued: “Can you try it on women?”
Sun Wu replied again: “Sure!”
Thus, the king sent out 180 beautiful ladies from his palace and Sun Wu divided
them into two teams with one of the king’s most beloved consorts to be the captain of
each.
Once at the start, Sun Wu asked the ladies: “Do you all know the difference
between front and back, your right hand and left hand?”
“Yes!” The ladies responded.
Sun Wu continued: “When I say ‘Eyes front,’ you must look straight ahead.
When I say ‘Turn left,’ you must face your left hand. When I say ‘Turn right,’ you
must face your right hand. When I say ‘Turn back,’ you must turn round towards
your back. Understood?”
“Understood.” The ladies replied.
When the drums were thundered, Sun Wu gave his first order: “Turn right!”
The ladies burst out laughing. Sun Wu announced: “If the order was not
sufficiently clarified, that is the fault of the commander.”
The drill continued as Sun Wu gave his second order: “Turn left!”
The ladies burst out laughing again. SunWu said: “When the order was clarified,
but it is not followed by the soldiers, this is the fault of the officers!”
Thus Sun Wu ordered the execution of the two captains. Stunned by Sun Wu’s
order, the king of Wu, watching from a high platform, hurriedly sent down his
words: “I already know you are capable of commanding troops, but please spare
the two concubines! Without them I won’t be able to know the taste of my food.”
Sun Wu replied, solidly: “Once commissioned by your majesty to command this
army, I am now in the field, and I have no leisure to take your order!”
A text called Audience with the King of Wu, written on bamboo strips
that parallels very closely the above narrative by Sima Qian, was
excavated in 1972 in tomb no. 1 at Yinqueshan in southern
Shandong, dating by the typological features of the ceramics and
coins from the tomb to the early phase of the Western Han. From
the same tomb, as many as 4,942 bamboo strips were excavated.
Astonishingly, included among the texts on these strips are also two
different texts both bearing the title Art ofWar. One is the Art ofWar of
Sun Wu which parallels very closely the received version of the text,
although the strips from the tomb offer only eight of the supposed
thirteen chapter titles. The other Art ofWar is identified with Sun Bin,
the handicapped general of the state of Qi who led the Qi army into
great victories over the hegemonic state Wei. This text not only elaborates
on the principles laid out by SunWu in the earlier Art ofWar, but
also records the career of Sun Bin and his struggle with Wei. Other
texts included in the corpus are the Wei Liaozi, Yanzi, Six Secret
Strategies, Shoufa shouling, all texts of military nature known previously
to have been produced in theWarring States period. These texts were
published together in 1981.
When the second volume on the Yinqueshan tomb was published
in January 2010, it offered an additional group of some fifty previously
unknown essays on government and military affairs, together
with other texts related to natural philosophy and divination. The
nature of the texts from the tomb suggests that the person buried in
the tomb might have been a professional military commander who
died in an early year of EmperorWu (r. 141–87 BC). Incidentally on
the bottoms of two wine lacquer cups from his tomb is written the
term “Supervisor of Horses” (sima), which was a well-known military
title. Although these texts are written in Han clerical style and
are Han Dynasty texts, many of them were doubtless transmitted
from the Warring States period if not earlier.
The Art of War by Sun Wu, the Wei Liaozi, and the Six Secret
Strategies are counted among the famous “Seven Military Classics”
for which full-length English translations are available.16
 
16 See Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.), The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993).

 

Автор (этнический китаец) приводит очень ценную информацию. Но датирует жизнь Сунь-Цзы (которого предпочитает именовать Сунь-У) - ровно так, как любят сами китайцы, то есть по Сыма Цяню. То есть концом эпохи Вёсен и Осеней (конец 6 или 5 века до н. э.). То есть ещё до начала (или в самом начале) эпохи "Сражающихся царств".

 

Дорофи Перкинс, "Энциклопедия Китая. История и Культура", издательство Рутледж, 1998 год:

 

SUNZI (Sun Tzu; fourth century В. С.) A military strategist,
also known as Sun Wu, who is attributed with writing
the classical Chinese treatise on the art of war and strategy,
known as The Art of War, The Military Science of Sunzi, simply the Sunzi (Sun Tzu; Master Sun). This text actually
was compiled in the fourth century B.C. It was later incorporated
into the canon of the Daoist religion, a collection of
1,400 texts printed in 1445 known as the Daozang (Jao
Tsung). Bamboo slips bearing the text of the Sunzi were discovered
in tombs on Yinque Mountain dating from the Han
dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220).
Sunzi was born to a military family in modern Huimin
County, in the state of Qi in modern Shandong Province, and
he studied military science. He began his text on the art of
war by arguing that war is the most important matter to a
government, determining the survival or death of the state.
Some of the 13 chapters are titled "The Strategy of Attack,"
"Disposition of Military Strength," "Use of Energy," "Weaknesses
and Strengths," "Maneuvering," "Variation of Tactics"
and "The Use of Spies." Sunzi maintained that the way to
victory is to work in harmony with nature rather than simply
to employ brute force, and to outwit the enemy and win by
deceit without having to fight a battle. He told the story of a
general who tricked his enemy into believing an undefended
city really was protected by a large army by leaving the city
gates open and leisurely playing a musical instrument on the
city walls. Sunzi taught that if a battle is necessary, it should
be fought quickly, with surprise attacks that strike at the
enemy's weak point, to force a quick victory.
Sunzi's work, which was compiled sometime between 400
and 320 В. С. was widely read at the end of the Warring States
Period (403-221 В. С.) when many feudal states in China
were contending with each other for power. It was certainly
studied by the First Emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, a harsh ruler
who unified China under the Qin dynasty (221-206 В. С. The Sunzi continued to influence Chinese military leaders,
scholars and strategists, such as the great general Cao Cao
(Ts'ao Ts'ao; 155-220), who wrote commentaries on the text.
The modern Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong (Mao
Tse-tung) drew upon the ideas of Sunzi while developing his
strategy for the Chinese Communist People's Liberation
Army (PLA), which in 1949 defeated the Chinese Nationalist
(Kuomintang; KMT) army led by Chiang Kai-shek, enabling
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to found the People's
Republic of China (PRC). In the eighth century the Sunzi was
introduced to Japan and other foreign countries. In 1772 the
work was introduced to Europe through a translation by a
French Jesuit priest published in Paris, and it was studied by
Napoleon Bonaparte. The work has now been translated into
more than 12 languages.
In 1992 the Academy of Classical Learning of Sunzi was
opened at Huimin in Shandong. The PRC has held several
international symposiums on the military science of Sunzi,
with scholars discussing such concepts as the application of
Sunzi's principles to modern business management. Books
on this topic have been published in Chinese, Japanese and
English. Contemporary military leaders around the world
have studied Sunzi's teachings on the art of war. During the
Persian Gulf War in 1991, the chief commander of the U.S.
Marine Corps required all marine officials to read an English
translation of the Sunzi See also CAO CAO; DAOISM; DAOIST
CLASSICAL TEXTS; JESUITS; MAO ZEDONG; PEOPLE'S LIBERATION
ARMY; QIN SHI HUANGDI; WARRING STATES PERIOD.

 

 
 
То есть та же датировка текста - он был составлен, согласно автору Энциклопедии, в 4 в. до н. э.

 

В письме к своему другу, Рен Шаокину, Сыма Цянь писал:

 

Those like Tso Ch’iu, who was blind, or Sun Tzu, who had no feet, could
never hold office

 

 

То есть люди слепые, как Чи-ю, или безногие, как Сунь-Цзы, не могли занимать в Китае должностей. Поэтому эти двое и ушли на покой, где написали свои книги.

 

Qizhi Zhang
"An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture"
изд. Foreign Language Teaching and Research Publishing Co., Ltd and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
2015

 

 

It is generally believed that the military thought of ancient China originated in the

Spring and Autumn Period, with the book Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa)
being its representative.Actually this is not borne out by history.As a seasoned book
discussing military tactics, that work came to be regarded as the canonical treatise
on the subject by tacticians of the subsequent dynasties, even though the thoughts it
expressed were not the oldest ones.

 

Ещё одна датировка работы Сунь-Цзы временами Вёсен и Осеней... И вновь - от китайского по происхождению автора... И более того - книга финансирована Китаем.

 

 

The Book of Changes (Zhouyi) is the earliest extant work that reflects ancient

military thought.1 These military thoughts were derived from the practice of war.
The period of transition from the Shang Dynasty to the Western Zhou Dynasty
 
1As early as the Southern Song, the famous scholar Wang Yinglin said in his book Example a
Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government (Tongjian Da Wen): “In the Book of Changes, the
military tactics was all included in it.” The same opinion was shared by the modern well-known
scholar Guo Moruo in his “Study On Chinese Ancient Society,” printed in On History, the first
volume of Guo Moruo’s Complete Works (People Publishing House, 1982), by Li Jingchi in his
Interpretation of the Book of Changes (Zhouyi Tongyi) (Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), and by
Gao Heng in Current Interpretations of the Ancient Book of Changes (Zhonghua Book Company,
1984).
 
witnessed a series of wars, which are noted in the Book of Changes. Generally
speaking, what the Book of Changes attaches the highest value to is peaceful
coexistence and a situation in which those who abuse their power to bully the weak
are put to shame. As is stated by the sequence of nine Chinese characters which
forms the bottom line of the “Dui Hexagram” (Dui Gua): “[h]e [who] treats people
amiably will enjoy good fortune.” Dui means “harmony.” The harmony between
nations can invite great fortune. The sequence of nine characters in the second line
of the “Dui Hexagram” follows on with “[h]e [who] treats people amiably with
good fortune his regret will disappear.” The sequence of six characters in the third
line of the hexagram says: “[h]e [who] pleases others to seek amiability, he will have
troubles.” It can be seen that misfortune will befall a nation which takes advantage
of its power and imposes its will on the other nations. Reading certain descriptions
of war in the Book of Changes, it may be discerned that the author of the book was
strongly antiwar. The nine characters in the fourth line of the “Li Hexagram” (Li
Gua) state: “he [who] is violent and brutal as a sudden fire burns all things into
ashes, thus he is discarded by people.” This could be referring to a swift attack
which causes disaster for the attacker. The sentiments of the author are therefore
pacifist, and what he was seeking was a peaceful world in which “the rulers rule
the nation mildly, and every nation is in peace.” This is in accord with the political
thought of the rulers of theWestern Zhou – “[w]e launch wars to protect our people”
and “[b]e benevolent to all the people and treasure their property.” These thoughts
were repeatedly promoted.
While the Book of Changes advocates a peaceful approach when dealing with
disputes between nations, it does not object to justified war where sufficient reason
exists. The six characters in the top line of the “Qian Hexagram” (Qian Gua) say:
“[h]e shows his modesty and sympathy, but it is not quite effective, he has to resort to
arms to solve disputes within his states.” It is vital for a ruler to win moral support
before he launches a war, for that support may help him to survive the war. The
nine characters in the top line of the “Meng Hexagram” (Meng Gua) tell us: “[h]e
punishes the ignorant, violence will bring hostility; proper measures enable both
sides to cooperate against dense ignorance.” This means that to actively invade other
nations will prove unprofitable for one’s country, whereas wars of defense will be
profitable. The Book of Changes reiterates that one has to be prudent with warfare
and must lay emphasis on the preparation and planning for a war before it breaks
out. One should never launch a war ignorantly. This much can be gleaned from
the words of the “Yu Hexagram” (Yu Gua): “[i]t is a favorable time for the king
to establish his vassal and go on a campaign.” Military affairs and national events
require our careful consideration and comprehensive preparation. Once troops have
been dispatched, the discipline and the rules by which they are governed are of
profound consequence to the outcome of the war. The sequence of six characters in
the bottom line of the “Shi Hexagram” (Shi Gua) maintains that “the army must be
strictly disciplined in its military operations; otherwise there will be misfortune.”
For an army without strict discipline, victory will prove to be as elusive as a castle
in the air. The Book of Changes also talks about the guiding principle behind wars.
The first principle is to be brave and resolute when attacking. As is said in the
sequence of nine characters in the fourth line of the “Jin Hexagram” (Jin Gua),
“[h]e makes progress like a greedy and timid rat. If he persists, he will meet with
danger.” Timidity will inevitably meet with failure. The second principle is to seize
the fortress and to defeat one’s enemy with a single blow. The sequence of nine
characters in the third line of the words of the “Tongren Hexagram” (Tongren Gua)
reads as follows: “[t]he troops hide in ambush in the grass, he climbs up the high
hill to keep a close watch on the enemy. For three years, he dares not attack the
enemy.” Sometimes, one battle will be sufficient to cripple one’s enemy so they will
be unable to recover for several years.

 

То есть первые мысли военной теории выражаются в тексте, датируемом ещё ранее, чем Сунь-Цзы - в "Книге перемен". Далее был трактат Сунь-Цзы:

If one esteems themilitary thoughts in the Book of Changes as a piece of valuable

jade, then Sun Tzu’s The Art of War may be seen as a precious pearl. Regarded as
the “originator of oriental strategies,” that text served as a guidebook for the military
thoughts and practices of later dynasties. No book emerged in subsequent times
which could exceed its breadth and depth.
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War was written by Sun Wu (544–496 BC), who was a
famous general in the State of Wu. The book consists of thirteen articles, each
dealing with a particular topic. Collectively, these topics form a complete system
of ideology.
Sun Tzu was always prudent where war was concerned. This prudence towards
war can be witnessed in all of his articles. He said: “[t]he art of war is of vital
importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or
to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected”
(Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: On Laying Plans – Ji Pian). War matters much to the
existence and the life of the people. Thus, we have no choice but to handle it with
care. Sun Tzu was for “prudence in war,” but he was not afraid of war. He thought
that when choosing to go to war or not, the core criterion should be whether or not
this served the national interest. As it is written:
Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without
cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is a waste of time and general stagnation.
Hence the saying: ‘The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general
cultivates his resources.’ Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless
there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. No ruler should put
troops into the field merely to gratify his spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out
of pique. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Anger
may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. But a kingdom that
has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought
back to life. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful and the good general full of caution.
This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War:
Attack by Fire – Huo Gong Jian)
Any war – whatever form it takes and whatever strategy it uses – must be closely
related to the interests of politics and the economy. Thus, we can see that “interests”
(Liyi) is the broadest and the most common expression for the purpose of war.
In this vein, Sun Tzu decided to generalize the factors that affect a war into five
aspects: “The first is the Moral Law, the second is Heaven, the third is Earth, the
fourth is the Commanders, and the fifth is Method and Discipline” (Sun Tzu’s The
Art of War: Laying Plans). Among the five factors, the Moral Law (Dao) is the
most important. He states that “The Moral Law is to make the people and their
lord be of one mind,” so it means to win the support of the people. Factors such
as the heaven (Tian), the earth (Di), the commanders (Jiang), and the method and
discipline (Fa) follow on from this. The “Heaven” signifies Yin and Yang, cold
and heat, times and seasons; the “Earth” comprises high and low distances, far
and near, broad and narrow, great and small, danger and safety, open ground and
narrow passes, the chances of life and death; “the Commanders” vary in wisdom,
faithfulness, benevolence, courage and strictness; “Method and Discipline” are
different in quzhi (military formation), guandao (responsibilities of the officers),
and zhuyong (supply). These summaries laid foundation for the strategic analysis.
The highest goal guiding warfare in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is that “the skillful
leaders subdue the enemy’s troops without any fighting,” which means that he can
achieve his strategic goal of “self-defense and winning outright” through launching
deterrents. He states that:
In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture a regiment, a
detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. Hence to fight and conquer in all your
battles is not supreme excellence; the supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s
resistance without fighting. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s
plans; the next best thing is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order
is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled
cities [ : : : ]. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting;
he captures their cities without laying siege to them; He overthrows their kingdom without
lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the
Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of
attacking by stratagem. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Attack by Stratagem – Mo Gong Pian)
Sun Tzu believed that the best policy in military affairs was to win through
strategy; the second best was to win through diplomacy; the worst was to win
through war; to besiege a city was even baser still than the worst policy.
Nevertheless, “[t]o subdue the enemy’s troops without any fighting” is a goal that
is hard to achieve. Hence, Sun Tzu placed greater emphasis upon how to pursue a
war in reality. He put forward a number of guidelines to help people conduct wars.
For instance, “[i]f you knowyour enemy and yourself, you need not fear the result of
a hundred battles.” Also, “[t]he clever combatant imposes his will upon the enemy,
but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” These two quotations
signify that one should be positive in the war, so that one will not be led by the
enemy. Sun Tzu went on to write that “[h]e who can modify his tactics in relation
to his opponent : : : [can] : : : thereby succeed in winning.” This means that one
should be swift in adapting one’s methods according to a change in one’s enemy.
This is the same point as is being imparted in the clause “just as water retains no
constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.” To be stubborn is the
last resort. He tells us: “[i]n war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy
campaigns.” The economy lays the material foundation for the war, for as it states
in the book:
In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many
heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail–clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry
them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainments of
guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach
the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100
000 men. (Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Waging War – Zhou Zhen Pian)
War is so costly that no nation can withstand a lengthy campaign. Thus, Sun Tzu
suggested that “[i]n the war, let your great object be victory, not : : : [a] : : : lengthy
campaign,” for he had realized that “if the campaign is protracted, the resources of
the State will not be equal to the strain” and the consequences would be awful.
There are many multisided theories in relation to defense and attack in Sun Tzu’s
The Art of War. The rule for offsetting the army is:
[i]f our forces are ten to that of the enemy, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if
twice as numbers, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer the enemy;
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we
can flee from him. (Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Terrain – Xing Pian)
The commander should know well how to deal with the relationship between
defense and attack. The book notes this in the following way:
The good fighters of the old times first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat,
and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. To secure ourselves against
defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the
enemy himself. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot
make certain of defeating the enemy [ : : : ]. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Tactical
Dispositions – Jun Xing Pian)
The positive element of defense is always in your hands, while the opportunity
to attack is provided by the enemy’s error and negligence. As it states in the
book: “[t]he general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses
of the earth” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Tactical Dispositions). Also, he will
robustly and secretly defend himself. In addition, in attack, he “flashes forth from
the topmost heights of heaven.” Moreover, he will surprise the weak and avoid the
strong. Meanwhile, he will launch a sudden attack on the area where the enemy is
unprepared. These factors all contribute to the mystery of the war.
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is also very particular about the distribution of military
forces in war. It records:
The control of a large force : : : [follows] : : : the same principle as the control of a few
men: It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. Fighting with a large number
army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely
a question of instituting signs and signals. To ensure that your whole host may withstand
the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is affected by direct and indirect
maneuvers. (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Energy – Shipian)
This means that in order to command an army which is great in number, one
should depend on the appropriate distribution of military forces and groups. If
one wants the whole of the army to act as one and to fight to their best, then
one should rely on proper commanding (the use of “signs and signals” – Jinqi,
Jingu); if one wants one’s army to be in a position of constant victory, one should
turn to the application of “direct and indirect maneuvers” (Qizhen). “Direct and
indirect maneuvers” are military terms that were widely used in ancient China.
This contained two sides: in the distribution of military forces, the side responsible
for attacking the enemy openly was the “direct” one; the side responsible for
surrounding and outflanking was the “indirect.” The side for clamping down on the
enemy was the “direct” one; the side for striking was the “indirect.” Fighting with
the enemy with formations on the battlefield was “direct”; taking flexible military
actions was “indirect.” As for the method of war, attacking openly was “direct”;
a rapid strike was “indirect.” To fight according to common ways was “direct”; to
use an element of surprise was “indirect.” Sun Tzu writes: “[i]n all fighting, the
direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
in order to secure victory” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Energy). According to this,
we may see that a skillful commander must be adept at the use of both “direct” and
“indirect” maneuvers. As it states in the book: “[i]n battle, there not more than two
methods of attack—the direct and indirect; yet those two in combination give rise to
an endless series of maneuvers” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Energy). Commanding
a war is amatter of using of direct and indirect maneuvers. The direct attack between
troops always meets their victory by the use of indirect maneuvers, which include
flank attack, outflank, sudden attack, surrounding, and so on. The combinations
of direct and indirect maneuvers are endless, as is the military distribution (the
military energy and battle formation). Consequently, the commander should not be
too stubborn.
Sun Tzu once said: “[i]f you know both your enemy and yourself you need not
fear the result of a hundred battles.” “Knowing your enemy” (Zhi Bi) is being able to
obtain information about your enemy,which is of direct consequence to the outcome
of the war. As is demonstrated in the book, “ : : : what enables the wise sovereign
and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of
ordinary men, is foreknowledge.” Now knowledge cannot be elicited from spirits,
it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor deduced by any calculations.
Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be gleaned through spies. Sun Tzu
attached special importance to the use of spies, upon whose intelligence the whole
troop could base their actions. Meanwhile, Sun Tzu pointed out that “spies cannot
be useful[ly] employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. They cannot be properly
managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.Without subtle ingenuity of
mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.” When using spies, one
has to be wise, resolute, and careful in order not to be taken in by the enemy. As
is said in the book, “[i]f you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will
not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and the Earth, you may make your victory
complete” (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: Terrain). Closeness, a narrow horizon, and
self-approbation will never lead to victory.

 

 
 
Далее был одноимённый с работой Сунь-Цзы военно-теоретический трактат Сунь Биня, Сунь Бин Бинфа, обобщивший военно-теоретические достижения китайцев его времени. В целом этот трактат продвигает идеи Сунь-Цзы:

 

The Warring States Period witnessed a series of wars (picture 12), which
provided military thinkers with rich materials. Sun Bin’s Art of War (Sun Bin Binfa)
stands as its representative, revealing all the features of the military thoughts of that
era.
Sun Bin’s Art of War was written by Sun Bin and his followers. Sun Bin was a
man of the State of Qi in theWarring States Period.2 Containing thirteen articles, the
book is regarded as the inheritance and promotion of the military thoughts recorded
in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.
Fundamentally, Sun Bin’s Art of War continued the thoughts of “prudence
towards war” (Shen Zhan) found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. The book held that
the results of war determine the fate of a nation. The result will determine whether
the nation will bloom or fade. For this reason, we are required to tread with care:
“Victory will ensure the survival of a nation; while losing a war will make your
lands decrease and endanger your state. Thus it is indispensible for the one who is
to launch a war to think completely” (Sun Bin’s Art of War: On Meeting Wei Wang
of Qi – Jian Wei Wang).
2Records of the Grand Historian: Biographies of Sun Tzu and Wu Qi (Shiji: Sunzi Wuqi Liezhuan)
records the following: “[a] hundred years latter of Sun Tzu’s death, there was a tactician called
Sun Bin.” The History of the Han Dynasty: Treatise on Literature (Hanshu: Yiwen Zhi) describes
Sun Bin’s Art of War, which it calls Sun Tzu of the State of Qi (Qi Sun Bin), as being lost. Since
the Northern Song Dynasty, ancient classical writers became so skeptical that someone held that
the author of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War was Sun Bin, while the book Sun Bin’s Art of War never
actually existed. The copies of Sun Tzu’s The Art Of War and Sun Bin’s Art Of War recorded on
bamboo, which were discovered in the Han Tombs on Mount Silver Bird, Linyi, Shandong in 1972
quashed those doubts.

 

 

И т. д. - далее не цитирую. В принципе далее речь уже не о Сунь-Цзы.

 

SUN TZU A NEW TRANSLATION BY MICHAEL NYLAN, W. W. Norton and Company, 2020:

 

Почему оспаривается историчность личности Сунь-Цзы, а также проблема авторства "Искусства войны":

 

 

By the experts’ current understanding, all early Chinese texts are “composite texts,” texts compiled over time from impressive rhetoric ascribed to certain authors, often on vague impressions and little or no evidence. The Art of War (Sunzi bingfa

) is no exception to this general rule. Compiled in the last century or so of the Zhanguo period (475–221 BCE),2 the work doubtless represents insights garnered over long centuries by different hands, possibly even by experts operating in different locations. That said, up to today, later writers, whether commentators or not, have generally accepted the same long-standing tradition: that TheArt of War text was compiled by Sunzi (Sun Wu 
, or Sun Tzu), who served the king of Wu 
 in the late sixth century BCE. However gratifying this tale, it cannot be verified at this remove, and indeed is unlikely to be true.
Although a Sunzi (Master Sun) makes a brief appearance in the Lüshi chunqiu
 (compiled ca. 238 BCE), Sun Wu, the legendary general to whom The Art of War is ascribed, does not appear “on record” before Sima Qian’s Historical Records or Shiji (compiled ca. 90 BCE) composes a biography for him. (An excavated manuscript from around the same time as the Shiji bears witness to Sun Wu’s immense fame as military master, however.) Before the second century of Western Han rule, then, the Sun Wu legend is nearly complete: this Sunzi is the advisor who persuaded King Helu of Wu to adopt a new mode of warfare, deploying mass infantry troops rather than nobles in four-horse chariots—a method credited with gaining Helu’s stunning victory over his neighbor, mighty Chu, in 506 BCE. Sunzi’s method and tactics are summarized in Sima Qian’s biography in one memorable scene where Sunzi drills 180 of the king’s concubines in the new tight battle formations he envisions, and dares to behead two of them who disobey his orders. Having persuaded the palace women that they should follow him “through heaven and earth,” he goes on to lead the men of Wu by similar methods to an easy defeat of Wu's rival.
The problem is this: that Sun Wu alone, in stark contrast to such heroes as Wu Zixu and Pang Juan, does not figure in any of the early masterworks that lovingly detail the complex maneuvers of the southern kingdom of Wu. For this reason, scholars since the twelfth century have repeatedly queried the historicity of the Sunzi narrative. The doubters have explored a range of explanations for the anomaly: (1) that Sun Wu never existed, and he is no more than a doppelgänger for Wu Zixu; (2) that Sun Bin, a better-attested general working 150 years later for Qi, needed a respectable forebear, and so a Sun Wu (“Sun the Martial”) was devised to fill that role by a person or persons unknown; (3) that Sun Wu, whether he existed or not, is credited with the same characteristics as all other military geniuses in the story cycles; and (4) that listeners and readers well versed in the rhetoric of high cultural learning within manuscript culture freely invented and adapted usable pasts to any pressing matters at hand.
There is an old joke among classicists: “The Iliad was not written by Homer, but by somebody else with the same name.” This saying could be easily adapted to apply to The Art of War ascribed to Sunzi, as moderns today have no access to more biographical material about this master than we find in passages of fairly late date. Unless one can prove that the Sunzi who wrote TheArt of War is the same general Sunzi who drilled the king’s concubines and won the Battle of Boju, then the text might as well be compiled “by somebody else with the same name.”

 

Аллилуйя...

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Фотография andy4675 andy4675 20.06 2020

А почему пост появился в таком покоцанном виде? За что обрезали? Чем вам концовка поста - где сообщается САМАЯ ВАЖНАЯ информация - не понравился? Или не угодил...

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Фотография andy4675 andy4675 20.06 2020

"Книга перемен" (И-цинь) датируется эпохой Раннего Чжоу, между 1.000 и 750 г. г. до н. э. Это было руководство для гадания. В период 500 - 200 г. г. до н. э. эта книга обросла сборником комментариев, известных как "Десять крыльев" (Ши-и), и превратилась в космологическим текстом, с набором комментариев древнекитайских философов. Ядром исконного текста считается текст носящин название "Перемены Чжоу" (Чжоу-и). Современные учёные датируют собственно "Книгу перемен" как текст в его современной, известной нам ныне форме, по разному - от 10 до 4 века до н. э. "Книга перемен" считается одним из древнейших китайских текстов. Понятие "перемен" в названии текста принято интерпретировать в том смысле, что поскольку текст повествует о гексаграммах, то речь идёт о переменах, совершавшихся по ходу истории при начертании гексаграмм.

 

Китайский миф приписывает авторство "Чжоу-и" ("Перемен Чжоу") легендарному основателю династии Чжоу, Вэнь-вану и его младшему сыну Чжоу-гуну (практически основателю империи Чжоу). Также этот текст связывался с мифическим изобретателем китайских триграмм - Фу-си (это своего рода китайский Ной, а также мифический культурный герой Китая). В самом тексте Чжоу-и о его авторстве не сказано ничего. Во 2 веке н. э. среди китайских философов и комментаторов возник консенсус, приписывавший коллективное авторство "Книги перемен" Фу-си, Вэнь-вану, Чжоу-гуну и Конфуцию. Эту идею выдвинул комментатор Цзычен Ма Рон.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Ching

 

Понятно, что из четырёх "авторов" - один просто мифический, двое - как минимум легендарные, и только Конфуция можно считать лицом достоверно историческим. Но конкретно Конфуцию приписываться авторство стало сравнительно поздно, судя по всему.

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Фотография andy4675 andy4675 21.06 2020

"Анналы Люй Бу-вэя" - древнекитайский энциклопедический трактат. Традиционно датируется 239 г. до н. э. - и современные учёные согласны, что он составлен около этого времени. Впервые этот трактат упоминается Сыма Цянем (он жил примерно 150 лет после традиционной даты создания трактата). В них тоже (наряду с "Историческими записками" Сыма Цяня) упоминается личность Сунь-Цзы.

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Фотография andy4675 andy4675 21.06 2020

Куда девались китайские книги. Китайская версия (оспариваемая ныне - в том числе на основании свидетельств древнекитайских источников):

 

https://ru.wikipedia...бение_книжников

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